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Presidential pardon power is among the most expansive, unen-
cumbered, and suspicion-evoking of executive powers.1 Generally
speaking, Americans hold negative views of presidential pardons.
2
In recent poll responses, Americans report concern that Presidents
may conceal their own misdeeds when pardoning others, especially
when those pardoned are high-profile individuals.3 Such disquie-
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1. Frank Newport and Joseph Carroll, Americans Generally Negative on Recent Presi-
dential Pardons, GALLUP (Mar. 9, 2007), https://news.gallup.com/poll/26830/americans-gen-
erally-negative-recent-presidential-pardons.aspx.
2. See generally id. Recent statistics show that the American public opposed President
Ford's pardon of President Nixon, George H.W. Bush's pardon of Caspar Weinberger, and
President Clinton's pardon of Marc Rich. Thirty-eight percent of Americans felt that Ford
should pardon Nixon, while fifty-percent of Americans believed that Clinton should pardon
Rich at the time that the pardons were issued. Id.
3. Id. When asked why they supposed Bush had pardoned Weinberger and other Iran-
Contra operatives, forty-nine percent of respondents expressed that Bush was trying to pro-
tect himself or hide information from the American people. Bush's use of executive pardon
power in this manner may indicate the first time that a United States President used the
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tude persists even today. As Special Counsel Robert Mueller se-
cures indictments of members of President Trump's inner circle and
news continues to cycle of Trump's alleged criminal involvement,
Americans are fretful that Trump may abuse presidential power by
pardoning those implicated in the investigation, including family
and inner-circle members.4 This apprehension is not without merit.
Unlike other Presidents who have typically waited to exercise ex-
pansive pardon power until the waning days of their administra-
tion, Trump has already issued high-level, controversial pardons
with no hint of restraint and without typical Department of Justice
oversight.5 Shockingly, he has even publicly alluded to pardoning
his associates who have been indicted as a result of the Mueller in-
vestigation.6 Such a move is dangerous and would erode public con-
fidence in the Trump administration, an administration that is
unique in its struggle to secure and maintain public trust in the
integrity of the American system of government.
President Donald Trump's tenure in the White House has left
throngs of Americans feeling increasingly isolated from America's
dreams. The blatant racism, misogyny, xenophobia, and overall
contempt for any semblance of Americanism that is remotely misa-
ligned with overarching notions of white male heterogeneity labels
those who are neither white nor male as "misfits" who can never
enjoy the full and free benefits of American's bounteous promises.
7
Many Americans feel abandoned by an Executive who refuses to
recognize, that, we, too "sing America."8 A multitude of Trump's
pardon power to conceal his own potentially criminal conduct. Id.; William Schneider, Bush's
Pardons Break All the Rules, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 3, 1993), http://articles.latimes.com/1993-01-
03/opinion/op-864_lbush-s-pardons.
4. Michelle Mark, Can Trump Pardon Cohen or Manafort? Here's Who He's Given Clem-
ency to So Far, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 12, 2018, 2:03 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/who-
has-trump-pardoned-so-far-arpaio-johnson-scooter-libby-2018-5#joe-arpaio-8; Amber Phil-
lips, Yes, Trump Could Pardon His Former Aides. But Here's Why it'd Be a Terrible Idea,
WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/07/2 1 a-
legal-guide-to-pardoning-yourself-if-youre-the-president-of-the-united-states/.
5. Scott P. Johnson, President Donald J. Trump and the Potential Abuse of the Pardon
Power, 9 FAULKNER L. REV. 289, 319 (2018).
6. Mark, supra note 4.
7. See Dina Smeltz, A New Survey Shows That the Republican Party is Not the Party of
Trump, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/20 18/10/02/no-the-republican-party-is-not-the-party-of-trump-this-new-survey-
finds/. See also generally Eric Levitz, America Will Only Remain 'Majority White' If Blacks
Remain an Underclass, INTELLIGENCER (May 3, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/
05/for-america-to-be-white-blacks-must-be-an-underclass.html (explaining the fear of many
white Americans that a diverse, non-white majority United States could lead to whites be-
coming a racial minority and "suffer[ing] the same indignities that nonwhites were made to
suffer in this country").
8. Langston Hughes, I, Too, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON HUGHES (1995).
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policies, programs, and proposals, including the border wall na-
tional emergency declaration, travel ban executive order, tax
breaks for the wealthiest citizens, anti-transgender military stance,
and revival of unconstitutional stop and frisk tactics, typify his ad-
ministration's inherent culture of exclusion, disdain for legal his-
tory and tradition, and utter defiance of constitutional precedent.9
Even many of the faithful who originally supported Trump's presi-
dency, critically question his commitment to fair governance and
the rule of law.10 The foreseeable consequence of his scorn of our
system of government is the utter disillusionment of the governed.1
Disillusionment, however, proves detrimental to democracy.
The American system of democracy is unique in that it demands
belief among those it would govern, in its utility, power, and bene-
fits. 12 "[P]ublic satisfaction.., is the key goal of democratic govern-
ance,"13 as the United States ultimately "derives its powers from
the consent of the governed.'14 Scholars agree the American politi-
cal system can only perform effectively with the "support of the gov-
erned, and that such support will only occur if a system is perceived
9. See generally, e.g., Justin Wise, House Armed Services Chairman: Trump's Border
Wall Obsession Rooted in 'Racism, HILL (Jan. 8, 2019, 12:03 PM), https:lthehill.com/home-
news/house/424325-armed-services-chairman-trumps-obsession-with-borderwall-is rooted-
in-racism.
10. Joe Concha, Why Americans Are So Tired of Trump News, HILL (Dec. 19, 2018, 12:15
PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/white-house/422080-why-americans-are-so-tired-of-trump-
news; Harry Enten, Trump Is Facing Historically Bad Numbers for Re-election in 2020, CNN
(Jan. 30, 2019, 6:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/30/politics/donald-trump-reelection-
numbers-2020/index.html; Paul Waldman, Smart Republicans Are Already Abandoning
Trump. But They're Still Culpable, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/10/smart-republicans-are-already-abandoning-trump-theyre-
still-culpable/.
11. See Enten, supra note 10; Philip Bump, Americans Like Trump on the Economy. They
Dislike Trump for Being Trump, WASH. POST (June 8, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/06/08/americans-like-trump-on-the-economy-they-dis-
like-trump-for-being-trump/?noredirect=on&utm term=.1cc55078bc20; Philip Bump, Here's
What Trump Voters Who've Lost Faith in Him Look Like, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/08/10/heres-what-trump-voters-whove-
lost-faith-in-him-look-like/?utm term=.6ad256690da7; Jonathan Chait, Do Liberals Hate
Trump Because He's a Typical American?, INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 22, 2018), http://nymag.com/
intelligencer/20 18/10/do-liberals-hate-trump-because-hes-a-typical-american.ht ml; Stepha-
nie Perry, Poll: Millennials Disillusioned About Midterm Elections, NBC (Aug. 29, 2018, 4:31
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/poll-millennials-disillusioned-about-m
idterm-elections-n904436.
12. JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS'
BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 15 (Cambridge University Press et al. ed.,
2004).
13. Id.
14. Barbara Jordan, American Imports Revalued: "Tributaries of American Culture", 5
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 249, 249 (1996).
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as fair and just.' ' 15 The very balance of our esteemed democracy,
then, is weakened when the governed cease to believe that govern-
ment works. In this way, perception is reality. While scores of ini-
tiatives fuel the aforementioned disenchantment, presidential par-
don power triggers incredible skepticism at this specific moment in
history. 16
Relying on the premise that effective democracy requires a cer-
tain measure of public satisfaction, this Article argues that presi-
dential pardon power must be reformed and limited immediately,
in order to begin restoring public confidence in our Chief Executive
and in our overall system of government. In so offering, this Article
borrows from the retributive criminal justice tenet that perceptions
of fairness are integral to an effective administration of criminal
justice, and incorporates that principle in advocating for a novel
model of presidential pardon power. Following this Introduction,
Part I of this work provides a brief history of the original concept of
presidential pardon power, including its underlying assumption
that the President will always be a person of the highest character.
Part II explores the concept of perception as reality in the context
of the criminal justice system, and advises that retributive punish-
ment theory may be informative in constructing a novel model of
presidential power. Finally, Part III provides guidance in crafting
a reformed model of presidential pardon power that, in the absence
of the strong character envisioned by the Framers, will assist in
reestablishing public trust in presidential pardon power, the Chief
Executive, and our American democracy.
I. THE SCOPE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONTENT OF
CHARACTER
The scope of presidential pardon power remains the subject of ro-
bust debate. Scholars note that:
[T]he very factors that make the pardoning authority unique--
its ancient history, its oddly dual nature as a gift or a political
tool, its existence outside the normal system of checks and bal-
ances of democratic government, and the way it resonates to
15. Roberta K. Flowers, What You See is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Im-
propriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 700 (1998).
16. See Amanda Shanor, No, President Trump, You Are Not Above the Law, ACLU (June
18, 2018, 12:30 PM), https://www. aclu.org/blog/executive-branch/no-president-trump-you-
are-not-above-law (noting that while the Constitution provides Presidents with a broad par-
doning power, President Trump's recent claims of an even more far-reaching executive power
to pardon could potentially "undermine the democratic safeguards enshrined" in the Consti-
tution).
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the distant thunderclap of absolute power--are the same fac-
tors that make its existence and exercise controversial.
17
Throughout the years, the Supreme Court has grown to support
an expanding and broad interpretation of presidential pardon au-
thority, evolving from initially viewing it as a gift to considering it
as an almost exclusively unchecked grant of public welfare.
18
Though supported by the Court, modern-day application of this
seemingly unfettered power circumvents and frustrates the admin-
istration of criminal justice, a system that is secured by constitu-
tional protections and safeguards. The lack of legislatively-ap-
pointed guiding principles and the absence of judicial review are
among the traditional checks that are missing from the presidential
pardon power rubric, further boosting its controversial nature.
Scholars opine that:
[T]heir [presidential pardons] use typically involves marked
departures from the procedural regularities that swathe the
criminal justice process .... [T]hey represent a mechanism by
which the executive can override not only the authority of the
judiciary to impose a criminal conviction and sentence, but in
a larger sense, prevent the general aims of punishment ....
[E]xecutive pardons effectively circumvent the criminal adju-
dications occurring in the judiciary. Such adjudications ideally
and symbolically represent extraordinarily formal due process
19
There remains a fear that the President will abuse this extraor-
dinarily sweeping power, resulting in sustaining dialogues concern-
ing whether the power should be more limited, and if so, in what
specific ways. In contemplating a novel presidential pardon power
model, reformers consult the Framers and constitutional history.
Seeking guidance from the Framers of the Constitution does little
to settle the presidential pardon power controversy, but may be in-
structive in generating reform proposals. At a time when the threat
of revolution was a tangible prospect, the Framers initially justified
the grant of presidential pardon power as a means of suppressing
potential rebellions.20 The hope was that offering the olive branch
17. Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate ofRetributive Justice: Inter-
pretations from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413, 418 (1999).
18. Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1915); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 351
(1866); 59 AM. JUR. 2D Pardon and Parole § 13 (2019).
19. Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 17, at 414.
20. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
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of a "well-timed offer of pardon" to would-be insurgents might "re-
store the tranquility of the commonwealth."21 The power was to be
broad and its usage left to the discretion of the Executive. The his-
torical data suggests that the Constitutional Convention delegates
intended for presidential pardon powers to mirror the expansive
royal entitlement exercised by the English Crown.22 It therefore
lacks the checks, balances, and limited democracy characteristics of
other constitutionally enumerated governmental powers. This orig-
inal model, however, was not without critics. Detractors earnestly
complained of the potential for future abuse.
23
In response, some Framers found solace in the image they had
carefully crafted of the President and his powers. The original, as-
pirational view was that the President would act as a "political eu-
nuch, with the duty of only assuring that laws passed by Congress,
which is where the political action would occur, be faithfully exe-
cuted.'24 While the grant of pardon power was to be extensive, the
President himself was to occupy a much more limited role. Further,
the Framers earnestly believed that the President would be of such
exceptional character that he would never violate the law, nor
would he ever consider abusing this broad grant of power.25 In the
words of Framer Alexander Hamilton,
Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that the benign
prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered
or embarrassed. . . [I]t may be inferred that a single man
would be . . . least apt to yield to considerations which were
calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. The reflection
that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat,
would naturally inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread
of being accused of weakness or connivance, would beget equal
circumspection, though of a different kind.
26
History, however, recounts a distinctly contrasted narrative. Far
from a "political eunuch," the President "has been transformed into
the most powerful official in American politics and has been de-
scribed as the nation's Chief of State, Chief Executive, Commander-
in-Chief, Chief Diplomat, Chief Legislator, Chief of Political Party,
21. Id.
22. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 626-27 (Max
Farrand ed., Yale University Press 1911).
23. Id.
24. Johnson, supra note 5, at 303.
25. Id. at 290.
26. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20 (emphasis added).
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as well as several other important titles."27 The record is also clear
that American Presidents have, in fact, exercised the pardon power
beyond its originally envisioned reach, even perhaps crossing the
boundary into seemingly potential abuse. Included in some contro-
versial pardons are President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon in the
nascent years of his tenure, President Bush's pardon of six key fig-
ures involved in the Iran Contra affair (and the possible conceal-
ment of his own misdeeds in the process), and President Trump's
recent pardon of Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio.2S Additionally, Presi-
dent Trump actively speaks of and expresses interest in granting
pardons to his relatives and close associates.29 American Presi-
dents do not always abide by the code of conduct contemplated by
the Framers that justified such an expansive grant of presidential
pardon power.30 They are not always of the highest character. Nev-
ertheless, presidential pardon power remains nearly unchecked.
The time has come to reconsider the scope of presidential pardon
power. Democracy requires it.
II. PERCEPTION IS REALITY
American democracy demands active participation by the gov-
erned. The exceptional nature of the American system of democ-
racy insists that the governed maintain confidence in the system's
utility, power, benefits, and fairness because "public satisfaction..
• is the key goal of democratic governance,'31 and because the
United States ultimately "derives its powers from the consent of the
governed.'3 2 Actual fairness, however, is not required to earn the
public's confidence. Rather, the governed must have the impression
that the system that governs them is operating equitably.33 Percep-
tions of credibility lead to increased compliance with the law, while
27. Johnson, supra note 5, at 303.
28. Kenneth T. Walsh, A History of Presidential Pardons, U.S. NEWS (June 8, 2018, 6:00
AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2018-06-08/the-most-prominentpres
idential-pardons-in-history.
29. See Daniel Hemel & Eric Posner, If Trump Pardons, It Could Be a Crime, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/opinion/if-trump-pardons-crime-rus-
sia.html.
30. See generally Laura Palacios, Note, The Presidential Pardon Power: Interpreting Its
Scope and Enacting an Effective Solution to Limit Its Potential for Abuse, 40 T. JEFFERSON
L. REV. 209, 221-22 (2018).
31. HIBBING & THEISS-MORSE, supra note 12.
32. Jordan, supra note 14.
33. Flowers, supra note 15, at 701.
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lack of public trust may have serious consequences.3 4 Scholars as-
sert that the perception of justice is as important as its attain-
ment.3 5 In this way, perception is reality.
As in the case of our esteemed democracy, the criminal justice
system is also rendered impotent when people become less con-
vinced of its efficacy.36 As with all governmental systems, the crim-
inal justice system must be mindful of public perceptions of fairness
and justice.3 7  Studies demonstrate that perceptions of criminal
law's legitimacy give rise to "higher levels of cooperation and lower
rates of recidivism.13 8  Further, "people are less likely to comply
with laws they perceive to be unjust" or "with the law generally
when they perceive the criminal justice system as tolerating such
injustice."3 9 In this way, lessons gleaned from the criminal justice
system are instructive to presidential pardon power reform efforts.
According to scholars, "a criminal justice system derives practical
value by generating societal perceptions of fair enforcement and ad-
judication.' 40 Professors Josh Bowers and Paul H. Robinson reduce
this notion of "societal perceptions of fair enforcement and adjudi-
cation" into two distinct types: 1) legitimacy and 2) moral credibil-
ity. 41 Under this model, the legitimacy class of societal perceptions
focuses on criminal justice processes, and requires that they are
fairly, accurately, and uniformly executed.42 The moral credibility
category concerns the concept of justice, demanding that the crimi-
nal justice system produce equitable outcomes, thereby maintain-
ing its "reputation for moral credibility with its community."43
Though their internal operations vary significantly, the concepts of
legitimacy and moral credibility possess the same ultimate goal.
The aim of both is that people come to believe that the criminal jus-
tice system works, and, for that reason, choose to behave lawfully. 44
The criminal justice system simply cannot function effectively if the
general population refuses to believe in it and conform to its laws.
34. Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L. REV.
953, 983-89 (2010); Josh Bowers and Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice:
The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 211, 211 (2012).
35. Flowers, supra note 15, at 699.
36. Bowers & Robinson, supra note 34, at 212.
37. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Pro-
cedure: The Case ofAlford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1386 (2003).
38. Bowers & Robinson, supra note 34, at 253.
39. Id. at 262.
40. Id. at 211.
41. Id. at 211-12.
42. Id. at 215.
43. Id. at 218.
44. See generally id. at 211-18.
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The legitimacy theory suggests that people adapt their behavior
to a system of criminal laws, policies, and programs because they
believe that the process is fair.45 According to Bowers and Robin-
son, "procedure is legitimacy's starting point."46 In their words,
"[p]eople come to obey the law and cooperate with legal authorities
because they perceive their institutions to operate fairly," such that
"perceptions of procedural fairness facilitate a kind of normative, as
opposed to purely instrumental, crime control. '47 The perception of
fair process induces a commitment to fully participate in the system
by adjusting one's conduct to comport with the system's require-
ments. In the words of Bowers and Robinson:
[C]itizens of a procedurally just state comport their behavior to
the substantive dictates of the law not because the state exer-
cises coercive power ... but because they feel a normative com-
mitment to the state .... an individual ... complies with the
law not because he rationally calculates that it is in his best
interest to do so but because he sees himself as a moral actor
who divines that it is right to defer to legitimate authority.
48
Fair process, then, leads to increased compliance with and belief in
the law. The perception of justice does as well.
The moral credibility aspect of fair enforcement and adjudication
contends that "doing justice may be the most effective means of
fighting crime."49 While legitimacy contemplates the process aspect
of criminal justice, moral credibility ponders the punishment facet
of criminal justice.50 Per moral credibility, the criminal justice sys-
tem is rendered legitimate if it appeals to a community's shared in-
tuitions of justice, but succumbs to invalidity if it does not.51 Of the
many virtues of law, morality appears, arguably, to be among the
strongest, with people tempering their behaviors to fit the law be-
cause "they believe the laws to be just. ' 52 In this way, moral credi-
bility is steeped in retributivist theory. In the words of Bowers and
Robinson:




49. Id. at 216.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Gregory M. Gilchrist, Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy, 48 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 143, 162 (2011).
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Some of the system's power to gain compliance derives from its
potential to stigmatize .... Yet a criminal law can stigmatize
only if it has earned moral credibility with the community it
governs. That is, for conviction to trigger community stigmati-
zation, the law must have earned a reputation with the com-
munity for accurately reflecting the community's views on
what deserves moral condemnation. A criminal law with lia-
bility and punishment rules that conflict with a community's
shared intuitions of justice will undermine its moral credibil-
ity.5
3
However, like legitimacy, moral credibility only requires the per-
ception of justice to function appropriately. In other words, "legiti-
macy . . . does not actually demand that procedures be fair, only
that they appear to be," and "moral credibility ... does not actually
require that substantive rules produce just results . . . only that
they reflect people's shared moral intuitions."
54
Together, legitimacy and moral credibility explain if, why, and
when our criminal justice system works. Both, too, rely, rather
soundly, upon public perception; perhaps even more decidedly than
actual truth. The pair attempts to legitimize the criminal justice
system by rendering it fair, just, and therefore effective in the
minds of the people.55 Perception is the tie that binds them. This
may be recognized most readily when considering how the princi-
ples of legitimacy and moral credibility achieve their imagined ends
even when the system is, in truth, neither procedurally fair nor ap-
propriately aligned with empirical desert. Genuine procedural fair-
ness and empirical desert command a type of uniformity that must
be aspired to, but is nearly impossible to realize fully. In the case
of legitimacy:
legitimacy advocates must reconcile themselves to the fact that
a system premised even partially on legitimacy may come to
adopt procedural rules and standards that may vary from place
to place, community to community, and time to time--a sce-
nario that some may find especially problematic when it comes
to purportedly nationally applicable standards and rules.56
Studies suggest that even defendants who are unsuccessful in
court will refrain from "denigrat[ing] the judge or the system so long
53. Bowers & Robinson, supra note 34, at 217.
54. Id. at 246.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 234.
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as they believe their outcomes were reached by fair procedures."57
In the case of moral credibility, "studies make clear that current
criminal law regularly deviates from the community's justice judg-
ments," thereby "risk[ing] [and] undermining its moral credibility
with the community."58 The public confidence that is "essential to
the law's democratic legitimacy, moral force, and popular obedi-
ence"59 may be harnessed through perception.
Both the capability "of courts to influence the structure of law and
the ability of the police and other government officials to enforce the
law depend upon public satisfaction with, confidence in, and trust
of legal authorities."60 In reimagining presidential pardon power
and reestablishing confidence therein, the criminal justice system
model provides impactful, effective instruction concerning the per-
ception of fairness, the positive benefits of its presence, and the det-
rimental effects of its privation. Further, remodeling presidential
pardon power is at least one simple step in rebranding the criminal
justice system. Many scholars have suggested limiting presidential
pardon power, with limits on its exercise to convictions only and
detailing specific charges, emerging as primary recommendations.
6 1
While those are helpful proposals, a more radical approach is war-
ranted.
III. A NEW MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER
Presidential pardon power must be limited in order to launch the
process of restoring public confidence in American government, par-
ticularly in the executive branch. To commence this undertaking,
presidential pardon power must no longer be viewed as boundless.
Professors Clifford Dorne and Kenneth Gewerth acknowledge that
pardons should be "both justifiable according to some theoretical
scheme or framework and justified under the circumstances of the
individual case."6 2 Pardons, then, must be "justified by reasons hav-
ing to do with what is just[J" and must be supported by a "sym-
metry between the justifications of punishment and a theory that
would justify pardon.163 Relying upon Moore's theory, Dorne and
Gewerth advocate for a pardon model that entails pardoning only
57. Flowers, supra note 15, at 701 (quoting Tom R. Tyler, The Role ofPerceived Injustice
in Defendants'Evaluations of Their Courtroom Experience, 18 L. & SOC'YREV. 51, 70 (1984)).
58. Bowers & Robinson, supra note 34, at 241.
59. Bibas, supra note 37, at 1387.
60. Flowers, supra note 15, at 700 (quoting Tyler, supra note 57, at 51).
61. Johnson, supra note 5, at 322-23.
62. Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 17, at 420 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 421.
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those who do not deserve to be punished.6 4 They argue that this
model is necessary because of the "unreviewable and absolute na-
ture of the pardon power."6 5 Following this model, a board, guided
by specific, stated, measurable standards, could be empaneled and
empowered to approve 'justice-enhancing' pardon decisions."66
Dorne and Gewerth offer that criteria for determining whether an
offender is eligible for pardon would include wrongful convictions,
diagnosis of an extremely debilitating medical condition, issuance
of a grossly disproportionate sentence, amnesty considerations, age,
heroic acts of service, and whether a pardon is "strongly and une-
quivocally supported by [the] victim, [their] family, and/or [the af-
fected] community."6 7 This proposed model relies, almost exclu-
sively, on the retributive theory of punishment, which purports to
extend an amount and quality of punishment that is proportional
to an offender's moral blameworthiness.68 Retribution's core justi-
fication is proportionality, and retribution's assurance is that pun-
ishment will always be proportional, and therefore, fair.6 9 Relying
upon Dorne and Gewerth's proposal, the guiding principle for both
punishment and pardon would be retribution. It must be clearly
noted, however, that any reformed model of presidential pardon
power must limit pardon offerings solely to those who have been
convicted of a crime.
70
A. The Problem with Desert and Punishment
This author has regularly criticized the use of retribution as a
fundamental punishment principle because of the inability to pre-
cisely measure moral blameworthiness in determining periods of
incapacitation.71 Nevertheless, desert theory proves useful in con-
64. Id.
65. Id. at 420.
66. Id. at 450.
67. Id.
68. Retribution's goal is to ensure that offenders receive their "just desserts." See PAUL
H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW
MUCH? 74 (Oxford University Press, Inc., 2008).
69. Id. at 137. Desert may be categorized thusly: vengeful desert, deontological desert,
and empirical desert. Id. at 136. Each category apportions blameworthiness differently. Id.
Vengeful desert considers moral blameworthiness from the point of view of the victim. Id. at
137. Deontological desert examines moral blameworthiness based on the views of moral phi-
losophers. Id. at 138-39. Empirical desert distributes moral blameworthiness according to
the community's shared justice beliefs. Id. at 139.
70. Currently, presidents may pardon those convicted of a crime, and those simply ac-
cused of a crime. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 334 (1866).
71. See, e.g., Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment is Enough?: Embracing
Uncertainty in Modern Sentencing Reform, 24 J. L. & POL'Y 345 (2016) [hereinafter Jefferson-
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templating the potential for release. Retributive punishment the-
ory falls into two separate categories: desert pragmatism and desert
moralism.7 2 Desert pragmatism or empirical desert adopts the
"community's shared principles of justice" in assigning liability and,
ultimately, punishment, while desert moralism or deontological de-
sert relies upon "abstract principles of moral right and goodness.
'73
Together, they work to ensure overall justice so that "each offender
receives the punishment deserved, no more, no less.' 74 Scholars
agree that empirical desert punishment principles may help inform
presidential pardon power reform.7 5 In this regard, a more thor-
ough review of desert's underlying principles is informative.
Proportionality is the foundation of retributive punishment he-
ory.76 For criminal sentencers, proportionality requires a thorough
appraisal of the degree of an offender's moral blameworthiness, fol-
lowed by an evaluation of whether any proposed sentence is aligned
therewith.7 7 It has proven difficult, however, to measure propor-
tionality accurately. Just as "it is difficult to know or control which
particular details of an offender or offense inform a decision-
maker's assessment of desert,78 it is also nearly impossible to
measure how much punishment is enough.7 9 For desert to function
fairly, however, proportionality must be measurable-retribution
requires punishment no more and no less than what is deserved,
"solely because the offender deserves it. '8 The basic premise un-
derlying desert is that what is "deserved" is identifiable and quan-
tifiable. In its current form, retribution cannot be gauged and
translated into precise prison terms.81 It can, however, be helpful
Bullock, How Much Punishment]; Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, Are You (Still) My Great and Wor-
thy Opponent?: Compassionate Release of Terminally Ill Offenders, 83 UMKC L. REV. 521
(2015); Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Time is Ripe to Include Considerations of the Effects on
Families and Communities of Excessively Long Sentences, 83 UMKC L. REV. 73 (2014).
72. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL
LAW DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 19 (Oxford University, Inc., 2006).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Dorne & Gewerth, supra note 17, at 421.
76. Amit Bindal, Rethinking Theoretical Foundations of Retributive Theory of Punish-
ment, 51 J. INDIAN L. INST. 307, 311 (2009).
77. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment,
55 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 539 (2004).
78. Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1296 (2006) ("Racial bias, fear, [and] disgust ... can shape desert as-
sessments, but ... do so under cover of a seemingly legitimate moral judgment.").
79. See generally ROBINSON & CAHILL, supra note 72, at 36-37; Jefferson-Bullock, How
Much Punishment, supra note 71, at 398.
80. Russell L. Christopher, Time and Punishment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 282 (2005).
81. Jefferson-Bullock, How Much Punishment, supra note 71.
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in determining parameters for early release, discharge of a sen-
tence, or pardoning of an offense, generally.
B. Problem Solued-Retribution as a Guiding Principle in
Granting Presidential Pardons
Though our criminal justice system relies heavily on retributive
theory in distributing punishment, lawmakers have struggled to
pinpoint precisely how much punishment retribution requires.8 2
This is incredibly problematic because retribution expects meticu-
lous particularity. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
which birthed our current sentencing regime, severely limited
judges' previously unfettered discretion in sentencing.83 Rendering
mandatory minimum sentences advisory in later years did little to
empower sentencing judges to reduce the excessive lengths of incar-
ceration imposed by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act's Sen-
tencing Commission.8 4 Even modern-day legislative efforts have ac-
complished mere miniscule improvements in aligning punishment
with blameworthiness.8 5 However, a fragment of discretion re-
mains in judges' hands, and is expressed in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c),
which states, in part:
The Court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has
been imposed except that--(1) in any case--(A) the court, upon
motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, may reduce the
term of imprisonment ... after considering the factors set forth
in §3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds
that--(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction; or (ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age [and]
has served at least 30 years in prison ... ; and (2) in the case
of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered ... and that such a reduction is consistent with appli-
cable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion.8
6
This power to correct an arguably unjust punishment retroac-
tively is retribution's saving grace and should be how retributive
82. Id.
83. JORDAN BAKER ET AL., A SOLUTION TO PRISON OVERCROWDING AND RECIDIVISM:
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM LOCATION OF PAROLEES AND PROBATIONERS 42 (2002).
84. See Jelani Jefferson Exum, Sentencing, Drugs, and Prisons: A Lesson from Ohio, 42
U. TOL. L. REV. 881, 885-86 (2011).
85. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2019).
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theory is practically utilized. Presidential pardon power reform is
a natural point of departure for such an experiment.
There is historical support for this proposal. Alexander Hamil-
ton's view of presidential pardon power is grounded in the type of
reassessment of justice post-conviction that only retribution can
provide. In his words, "[t]he criminal code of every country partakes
so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to excep-
tions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a counte-
nance too sanguinary and cruel.87 Additionally, the majority of
Framers believed that, in the interest of justice, mercy should be
meted out by one individual of good character: the President.88
While a presidential pardon power model based upon retributive
justice is a good start, presidential discretion in this area still must
be limited. Following the practice of several states, a federal pardon
board should be implemented.8 9 Board membership must not be
limited to appointees chosen by the President and the reigning po-
litical party, but must include a term-limited, bi-partisan mix of in-
dividuals who are chosen, perhaps, at the state level. This group
should provide input to the President, based on statutory guidelines
steeped in retributive principles. While the President would retain
final decision-making power, the board's recommendation would be
part of the public record. Such a practice would work to restore
public confidence in the presidential pardon system by involving
and informing the public in the deliberative process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Public assurance is not only a paramount virtue of American de-
mocracy, it is an integral component. For our government to func-
tion effectively, the governed must perceive that the system is fair
and worthy. More specifically, public perception is an essential
component of presidential power as well.90 The President of the
United States is charged with "tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed" and upon assuming office, vows that (s)he "will
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and
will to the best of [his or her] Ability, preserve, protect[,] and defend
87. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20.
88. Id.
89. States that have a pardon board include Alabama, see ALA. CODE § 15-22-20 (2003);
Connecticut, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-124a (2015); Georgia, see GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-2
(1999); Idaho, see IDAHO CODE § 20-210 (2017); South Carolina, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-
10 (2012); and Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-2 (2011).




the Constitution of the United States."91 Despite broad presidential
authority in a number of areas, the president's authority is not lim-
itless and must not be viewed as such. Today, the American elec-
torate is actively questioning President Trump's authority, inten-
tions, and temperament in a manner that has been unprecedented
in modern American history.92 There are many reasons for this
growing distrust, but one that is on the minds of many Americans
at this moment in time is potential presidential pardon power
abuse.
The most obvious remedy to the quandary of seemingly abusive
presidential pardons provides no cognizable relief. Theorists opine
that the public may exercise its prerogative through voting, and
may simply vote an unruly president out of office. 93 While this is
true, a more expedient, dependable, and manageable remedy is
needed. Crafting of a presidential pardon power guided by retribu-
tive theory will assist in restoring public trust in the American pres-
idency by helping to destroy the perception of abuse. Such a schema
is closely aligned with the original concept of presidential pardon
power. More importantly, it will facilitate the restoration of public
confidence in presidential pardon power and in our overall system
of government, so that, even in the absence of a Chief Executive of
the highest character, we all may, with pride, "sing America."
94
91. U.S. CONST. art. II §§ 1, 3.
92. See, e.g., Noah Barkin, Trust in U.S. Institutions Plunges in Trump's First Year,
REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2018, 10:06 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-davos-meeting-
trust/trust-in-u-s-institutions-plunges-in-trumps-first-year-idUSKBNIFB8T; Sanford Lev-
inson & Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitu-
tional Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 133, 140 (2018);
Presidential Job Approval Center, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/interactives/185273/
presidential-job-approval-center.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2019).
93. See Barkow & George, supra note 34, at 986.
94. Hughes, supra note 8.
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